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As MARKED 1W DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS FOR APRIL.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas, it is the dutv of a railroad company to heat its cars
in cold weather, in order to provide proper accom-Carriers,
Negligence, modations for its passengers; and therefore it is
Failure of not necessary for a plaintiff, in order to recover
Railroad
Company for injuries due to the coldness of the cars, to
to heat Cars allege and prove a universal custom on the part of
railroad companies to warm their. cars: Ft. Woj-th & D. C.
Ry. Co. v. Hatt, 34 S. V. Rep. 677.
The Queen's Bench Division of England has recently
decided that a regulation of.a railway company, that "each
passenger shall ..... when required so to do
Regulations either deliver up his ticket or pay the fare legally
demandable for the distance traveled over by such passenger,
enforceable by a penalty, is reasonable; and that a passenger
who pays his fare and receives a ticket, and loses it through
accident, so that he cannot deliver it when required, but refuses
to pay the fare again, is liable to the penalty Ha'wks v.
Bridgman, [i896] I Q. B. 253 ; and moreover, that a regula-
tion which provides that each passenger shall show his ticket
(if any) when required so to do to the conductor or any duly
authorized servant of the company, enforceable by a penalty,
is also reasonable; and that if a passenger who has paid his
fare and received a ticket refuses to show it when properly
required, he is liable: Lowe v. Volp, [1896] i Q. B. 256.
The regulation of a railroad company that a commutation
ticket shall be surrendered by the passenger to the conductor
Surrender on the last trip taken during the period for which
of Ticket it is issued, is a reasonable regulation of the com-
panv in the conduct of its business as a common carrier of
passengers; and if this regulation is indorsed on the ticket.
and a passenger who holds such a ticket fails or reftes to
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surrender it on his last trip, or pay his fare to the conductor
according to the legally established rates of the company, he
can be ejected from the car: Rogers v. Atlantic Cit , R. R. Co.,
(Supreme Court of LNew Jersey,) 34 Atl. Rep. i i.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has refused to adopt the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of
Constitutional O'-eil v. State, 58 Vt. 140, (which the Supreme
Law, Court of the United States shirked so neatly in
Cruel and
Unusual O'Vei/ v. Vermnont, 144 U. S. 323.) in regard to
Punishment the infliction of cumulative fines for the violation
of a penal statute. In the case before it, State v. Wlhitaker, 19
So. Rep. .457, the record disclosed that the relators had
been committed to prison for a period of two thousand one
hundred and sixty days in default of the payment of fines
aggregating seven hundred and twenty dollars for each, and
the costs of prosecution, for the violation of a city ordinance ;
and that upon what was substantially one complaint they had
been found guilty of seventy-two distinct violations of an
ordinance within one hour and forty minutes, each of these
offences succeeding the other, only a minute and a half inter-
vening between the commission of any two of them. These
facts were held to show that the penalty inflicted was an
unusual and unreasonable punishment in the sense of the
constitutional prohibition.
There is but one exception to be taken to the language
used by the court in this case, and that is when it says that
the severity and unusualness of the punishment is even more
apparent than in the O'Neil case. In this, as has been stated,
the offences of which the relators were convicted were seventy-
two. the fines and costs something over $72o, and the days of
imprisonment 216o, while in the O'Neil case the number of
distinct offences of which O'Neil was found guilty was three
hundred and seven, the fines and costs $6638.72, and the days
of imprisonment 19,914, br over fifty-four years. It would
be harder to imagine a grosser instance of cruel and unusual
punishment. But that case has already been sufficiently criti-
cized in this magazine: 31 A.%i. L. REG., N. S. 618.
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The Supreme Court of the United States, by a bare
majority, has decided that the Act of Congress of February
Incriminating I I, 1893, which provides that no person shall be
Testimony excused from attending and testifying . . . before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, . . . on the ground or
for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or sub-
ject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but that no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or- on
account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise,
before said Commission; is not in conflict with the Fifth
Amendment, which declares that no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, since the
Act completely shields the witness against an), criminal prose-
cution which may be aided, directly or indirectly, by his testi-
mony, and in effect operates as a pardon for the offence to
which it relates: that the fact that the pardoning power is
vested in the President does not prevent Congress from grant-
ing amnesty, either before legal proceedings are taken, during
their pendency, or after conviction and judgment: that the
constitutional privilege of refusing to give self-incriminating
testimony was not intended to shield the witness from the
personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to his case, but only
from actual prosecution and punishment that the protection
afforded by the Act extends to any possible prosecution in the
State courts, as well as in the Federal courts : that even if there
is a bare possibility that by reason of his enforced disclosures,
the witness may be prosecuted in a State court, the danger is
so remote and improbable, and of so unsubstantial a character,
that it is not within the contemplation of the constitutional
immunity, and that the fact that the witness may be prose-
cuted, and put to the annoyance and expense of pleading his
Constitutional privilege by way of confession and avoidance, is
a detriment which the law does not recognize, and to which
the Constitutional provision does not extend: Brozn v. Walkcr,
16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, affirming 70 Fed. Rep. 46.
Mr. Justice Field dissented, on the grounds that the Fifth
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
Amendment affords absolute protection to an), witness who
desirei to avail himself of his privilege, not only from giving
evidence which might lead to his prosecution, but from giving
such as would expose him to disgrace and infamy; and that
the granting of a pardon is vested in the -president alone, and
cannot be exercised by congress. Mr. Justice Shiras, Mr.
Justice Gray, and Mr. Justice White also dissented, on the
grounds that the Act of February I 1, 1893, infringes the Fifth
Amendment, not only by subjecting the witness to the hazard
of a prosecution for an act concerning which he is compelled
to testify, but also by exposing him to the danger of a charge
of peijury in giving such testimony, which could never have
becn brought against him if the privilege of silence were not
taken away ; that Congress cannot grant immunity from prose-
cution in the State courts for an offense against the State,
though that offense be disclosed by self-incriminating testi-
mony, given as required by this Act in a tribunal of the United
States and that the probability that a witness may be prose-
cuted in a State court for an offense thus disclosed is not so
remote or fanciful as to warrant the court in disregarding it.
It has been lately held by the Supreme Court of Florida,
that though a witness may in general refuse to answer a
contempt, question that tends to incriminate him, yet, if he,
Refusal of being fully aware of his rights, consents to testify
Witnessto about the very matter that may criminate him,
Answer
Incriminating without claiming his privilege, he must submit to
Question
on Cross. a full, legitimate cross-examination in reference
Examination thereto ; and if he refuses to answer incriminating
questions put to him on cross-examination, he is guilty of
contempt: Ezparte Senior, 19 So. Rep. 652.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, a court which has committed an attorney
to prison for contempt cannot require him toHabeas
Corpus, purge himself of the contempt as a condition of
Effect permitting him to practice before it, when he has
been released on bail in habeas corpus proceedings to review
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the commitment, and such proceedings are still pending in.
another court : Exparit" Kearb', 34 S. W. Rep. 962.
It has been recently held by the Circuit Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, that under the Act of Congress
of 1874, which limits the right of copyright to
Copyright,
Cuts in such cuts and prints as are connected with the fine
Trade arts, there can be no copyright on cuts contained
Catalogue in a trade catalogue, and not offered for copyright
or to the public as works of fine art: J. L. Jlott Ironz Mcrwks v.
Co'w, 72 Fed. Rep. 168.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, the service of a summons in an action against
Corporations, a foreign corporation, on an officer thereof who is
Suit also the attorney in fact of the plaintiff for theAgainst,
Service of coimencement and prosecution of the action, is
Writ invalid, and confers no jurisdiction : Gcorgc v.
American Gining Co., 24 S. E. Rep. 41.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently reasserted its
former ruling that the burden of proving the insanity of a
Criminal person accused of crime rests on the defence:
Law, Keener v. State, 24 S. E. Rep. 28.
Insanity This is directly opposed to the recent ruling of
Defence,
Burden of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
Proof Davis v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353.
See 35 A.i. L. REG. N. S. 94.
Judge Rose, of the High Court of Justice of the Province
of Ontario, has lately defined the facts necessary to constitute
What an arrest, in Fors pth v. Godn, 32 Can. L. J. 288.
Constitutes an The plaintiff and the defendant had a disagree-
Arrest ment, and the defendant telephoned for a police-
man, who soon came, and said to the defendant, " Is this the
man ?" After learning both sides of the dispute, he said to.
the plaintiff, " You will have to come along with me to the
police station." No other words were used, and no resistance
made. Plaintiff, defendant and policeman walked to the sta-
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tion together, and there talked the matter over with the chief.
No information was laid, and the plaintiff was not detained
further. The policeman swore that he did not arrest the
plaintiff. But the judge ruled that the fact of arrest is a ques-
tion of law, and that if an officer, known to be such, takes
charge of a man, and the man reasonably thinks from the con-
duct of the officer that he is' under arrest, this constitutes an
arrest.
A piece of ground bounded on one side by a hoarding, and
on two other sides by stays which supported the hoarding, has
Betting, been lately held to be a "place " within the
'Place" meaning of the statute of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119,
which imposes a penalty upon an), person, "who, being the
owner or occupier of any house, office, room, or other place,
or a person using the same," shall use it for the purposes of
betting : Liddell v. Lofthousc, (Queen's Bench Division,) I896]
i Q. B. 295.
in Andrews v. Jfockford, [1896] I Q. B. 372, the Court of
Appeals has decided, distinguishing Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H.
L. 377, (1873,) that when the object with whichDeceit,
False the prospectus of a company is issued is not
Representa In merely to induce an application for an allotment
tion In
Prospectus, of shares, but also to induce persons to whom it
Liability to
Purchaser is sent to buy shares in the market, its function is
of Shares not exhausted when the stock of the company has
been allotted, and the person who issues the prospectus is
responsible for a false representation contained in it, and
known to him at the time to be false, to any person to whom
the prospectus has been sent, who is thereby induced to buy
shares and sustains a loss in consequdnce thereof; and further,
that when a person who has issued the prospectus of a coin-
pany. containing a representation known to him at the time to
be false, subsequently causes to be published a false repre-
sentation to the same effect as that in the prospectus, with the
direct intent of inducing persons to purchase shares in the com-
pany, he is responsible for the consequences to any one who,
having recei% ed a prospectus, purchases shares on the faith of
the false representation so published, and thereby suffers loss.
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The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently laid
down some general rules in relation to the use of the ballots
Election, as evidence in an election contest, which present
Contest, the law in that regard in a very terse and lucid
Ballots as
Evidence form. It holds (i) That one who has received a
certificate of election to office is not estopped in case of con-
test, from going behind the returns from ballot boxes which
were counted without objection by either party, and'which
formed the basis of the certificate ; (2) That in an election con-
test, the ballots of a certain box, which had been opened
before a legislative committee after the election, are admissible
when it appears that the opportunity for the ballots to have
been tampered with was a mere possibility : and (3) That
the fact that a discrepancy exists between the returns of
the votes counted from that ballot box and a recount
made by the court in an election contest does not indi-
cate that there was any alteration in the ballots after being
voted, nor tend to cast suspicion thereon, when the evidence
shows that, when the count was concluded by the election
officers, there were discrepancies between the tally sheets of
the different clerks of the election, which it was attempted to
reconcile by guessing at the result, and making changes
accordingly: Henderson v. Albright, 34 S. NV. Rep. 992.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately held
that the question whether an extraditable offence has been
committed is a question of mixed law and fact, but
Extradition,
Judgment of chiefly of fact; and that therefore the judgment of a
Committing magistrate, rendered in good faith, that the accused
Magistrate .
is guilty of the act charged, and that it constitutes
an extraditable crime, cannot be reviewed on the weight of
the evidence, and is final for the purposes of the preliminary
examination, unless palpably erroneous in law: Ornelas v.
Ruiz, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689.
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved has lately rendered a
very interesting decision in a most peculiar case: The Queen
Forgery, v. Riley, [1896] I Q. B. 3o9. The defendant, who
Telegram was a clerk in the head post-office at Manchester,
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had obtained from another peison permission to make bets in
his name with a certain firm of book-makers. On the day of
the Newcastle Handicap the defendant sent to the book-
makers a telegram placing a bet on a certain horse for that
race, which purported to have been handed in at another office
before the race was run, and thence transmitted to the head
office; but in reality the telegram was not handed in at the
other office at al!, but was sent by the defendant from the
head office after news had been received that the horse on
which the bet was placed had won the race.' The book-
makers, however, not knowing this, credited the third person
with the amount won at the current odds.
The defendant was indicted under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, § 38,
for obtaining certain money by means, of "a certain forged
instrument, to wit, a telegram; " and a majority of the court
held, in spite of the doubts expressed by the Chief Justice and
Justice Vaughan Williams, that the telegram was a forged
instrument within the meaning of the Act, and that the indict-
ment was good.
It has been recently decided by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, that when a husband had purchased land for his
Husbandand wife, under an agreement with her that she should
Wife, give a mortgage to a third person to secure the
Contracts
between, husband in the repayment of the bond given by
Enforcement him for the price, and so avoid the Common-Law
in Equity
rule prohibiting contracts between husband arid
wife, equity would, give effect to the transaction, so as to
enforce the equitable lien of the husband on the land for
repayment of the purchase price paid by him: Eckepmeyer v.
Hoffineier, 34 S. W. Rep. 521.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has recently, in Shak-
man v. United States Credit System Co., 66 N. W. Rep. 528, in-
Insurance, vestigated and defined the legal status and inci-
Credit, dents of a peculiar form of a contract of assur-
Guaranty ance, by which the credit of a merchant's cus-
tomers is assured to him. The contract, called a "certificate
of guaranty" was in effect a guaranty of the merchant
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against losses from sales on credit reulting from the insol-
vency of customers, to be determined in a manner specifically
described; and was accordingly held to be a contract of
insurance, within Rev. Stat. Wis. §§ 1977, 1978, so a; to
make the agent who solicited it the agent of the insurer to
all intents and purposes. It was further held that when the
contract provided that the customer must be rated in Dun's,
and rated at not less than a specified sum, one who is the
agent of the insurer for the purpose of soliciting such insur-
ance, transmitting applications, and collecting premiums, and
who receives pay therefor, has power to make an additional
agreement providing that if the customer is not rated in
Dun's, and is rated in Bradstreet's, the rating in the latter
shall be binding on the insurer; and that when the contract
provided that in calculating losses thee should not be
included therein any credit given exceeding a credit of thirty
per cent. on the lowest capital rating the customer was rated
at in the mercantile reports, if a larger credit than thirty per
cent. of the lowest capital rating was given the insured should
be allowed a credit of thirty per cent. of that rating, and the
excess only should be disallowed.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Claf~ln v.
United States Credit System Co., 43 N. E. Rep. 293, has also
held that a contract of this kind is a contract of insurance, and
that it is invalid in that State, as a species of insurance not author-
ized by its Insurance Act. (Stat. Mass. 1887, c. 214, § 78.)
In American Surety Co. v. Paidy, 72 Fed. Rep. 470, the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit has recently
Insurance, passed upon a number of questions arising under
Fidelity a contract of fidelity insurance. The more impor-
tant of these are as follows :
(i) The surety company executed and delivered to a bank
a bond, insuring the bank against loss by any act of fraud or
NoticeoLoss, dishonesty of its cashier in connection with the
Reasonable duties of his office, or the duties to which, in the
Time bank's service, he might be subsequently appointed,
which should occur during the continuance of the bond, and
be discovered within six months thereafter, and within six
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months from the death, dismissal, or retirement of the cashier
from the service of the bank. The bond provided that the
surety company should be notified of " any act" of the
cashier which might involve a loss for which the company
would be responsible, "as soon. as pract-abtk after -the occur-
rence of such act shall have come to the knowledge" of the
bank, and it required proofs of loss to be furnished to the
surety company. The bank suspended payment, and passed
into the hands of a receiver, who afterward notified the surety
company of the discovery of the dishonest acts of the cashier,
furnished proofs of loss, and brought suit against the surety
company on the bond. The evidence on the trial as to the
time when the dishonest acts of the cashier were discovered
was conflicting, and it was accordingly held that the question
whether the required notice was given with reasonable prompt-
ness was for the jury.
(2) The terms of the bond did not require notice of
Notice of Suspicion suspicion of dishonest acts to be given.
(3) The services rendered by the cashier as such to the
receiver after the suspension of the bank, were none the less
ActsinSer- rendered to the bank, and the surety company
vice of Bank was not absolved from liability for acts discovered
more than six months from the date of suspension, but within
six months from the date of his resignation from the service of
the receiver.
(4) A proof of loss under the bond, which set forth with
reasonable plainness, and in a manner by which a person of
Interpretation ordinary intelligence could not be misled, that
of Proofs of certain sums of money had been taken from the
Loss bank by means of acts of the cashier, described
in the proof, was sufficient, though it failed to aver explicitly
that a loss had been caused to the bank.
(5) Prior to the issue of the bond sued on, the cashier and
president of the bank had conspired to rob it, and had been
Knowledge of engaged in fraudulent practices. When applica-
Officers of tion was made for the bond, the surety company
Act of Cashier,
Notice to required a certificate from the bank of the
Bank cashier's good character. This certificate was
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
made by the president without any direct authority, so far as
appeared, from the board of directors, or any knowledge by
them that such a certificate was made or required. On these
facts, it was held that the president's knowledge of the dis-
honesty of the cashier was not to be imputed to the bank, so
as to make it responsible for the misrepresentations contained
in the certificate.
In another suit in the same court between the same parties, 72
Fed. Rep. 484, on a bond insuring the fidelity of the president of
Proofs of the bank, it was held (i) That proofs of loss under a
Loss bond of suretyship insuring an employer against
loss by the dishonesty of an employe are mercantile documents,
and are not to be tested by the same rules of interpretation as an
indictment, or even a pleading. They are only required to
contain a brief and general statement of the facts with sub-
stantial accuracy, truthfully informing the insurer how the
loss occurred, and not tending to mislead him either by
what they contain or what they, omit; and (2) That when
such a bond provides that certain statements and accounts
Prima Facie shall be "prima facie evidence " of a loss, that
Evidence of expression is not necessarily confined to the con-
Loss sideration of a claim by the insurer, before suit ;
and it is not error to instruct the jury, on the trial of an
action on such a bond, that the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case by offering in evidence the statements and
accounts referred to: See 34 A-.3. L. REG. & REV. N. S. 56o.
In a recent case the Supreme Court of Florida has ruled,
that since interest is not the mere incident of a debt, but corn-
Interest on pensation for the use or detention of money,
Unliquidated whenever it is ascertained that money ought to
Damages have been paid at a particular time, whether in
satisfaction of a debt, or as a compensation for a breach of
duty, or for a failure to keep a contract, interest should be
allowed thereon : and therefore the modern rule in regard to
the allowance of interest on claims for unliquidated damages
is, that whenever a verdict liquidates a claim, and fixes it as
of a prior date, interest should follow from that date. This
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makes the running of interest begin at least with the issuing
of the writ : Sullivan v. .3cAfillan, 19 So. Rep. 340.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion which
fails lamentably as an argument, 1as recently decided that
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the ConstitutionInterstate
Commerce, does not affect the right of a State to prohibit the
ame transportation outside of its limits of game killed
in the State; that the ownership of the wild game within the
limits of a State, so far as it is capable of ownership, is in the
State for the benefit of all its people in common; and that
therefore the police power residing in a State authorizes it to
forbid the killing of game within the State with intention to
procure its transportation beyond the State limits : Geer v.
Conneeticut, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6oo.
Mr. Justice FIELD and Mr. Justice HARLAN dissented.
In Owens v. AfcCloskey,, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693, it was lately
held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that since in
Pennsylvania a scire facias to revive a judgment isJudgment,
Scire Facias regarded as a substitute for an action of debt on
to Revive, the judgment, and the judgment rendered thereon
Effect
is quod reenperet, instead of a mere award of execu-
tion, a judgment so revived in Pennsylvania, without service or
appearance, has no binding force as against a defendant who
resides in another State; and that the revival of a judgment by
scirefacias, for purposes of execution, on two returns of nii,
operates merely to keep in force the local lien, and does not
stop the running of the statute of limitations in another State,
where the defendant resides.
If a father takes his child of tender years out of the State,
with its consent and with the consent of its mother, to whom
Kidnapping, its custody had been awarded in divorce proceed-
Takingof order tha
Child by ings, in t the child may not be present at
Father a criminal trial in which it had been subpoenaed as
a witness, he is not guilty of kidnapping: John v. State,
(Supreme Court of Wyoming,) 44 Pac. Rep. 5I.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recently laid down
several interesting rules of law arising from the relation of
Landlord landlord and tenant, as follows:
and Tenant, (I) That one who enters upon lands as the
Tax title,
Adverse tenant of the grantee of a dower interest, and
Possession, agrees to redeem the lands from a prior tax sale
Dower
Interest to the State, cannot acquire title by purchase
from the State, but that such a purchase becomes a redemption
in favor of his landlord;
(2) That in such a case the abandonment of the dower
interest by the grantee thereof does not operate to make what
had been as to her a redemption a purchase by the tenant,
and make him an owner thenceforth in adverse possession
against the dowress, or her heirs who were owners in fee of the
reversion, without notice to them of his claim of title ; and
(3) That one who is in possession of lands as tenant of a
grantee of a dower interest therein becomes, after the death of
the dowress, a tenant at sufferance of the owners of the
reversion ; and if he allows the lands to be sold for taxes, he
cannot afterwards purchase them, and set up the title against
the heirs, without notice: Lyebrook v. Hall, 19 So. Rep. 348.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has lately
held. that it is not error to charge the jury, in an action
Libel, for a libel published in a newspaper, that the
Newspapers, greater extent of circulation makes the libel of a
Degree of Care journalist more damaging, and imposes special
duties as to care to prevent the risk of such mischief, propor-
tionate to the peril: Enquirer Co. v.Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep. 443.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has recently
decided a novel question, in the law of libel. It holds that
since a cause of action for libel, founded upon
Statements in
Judicial publications made in the course of judicial pro-
Proceedings, ceedings, does not accrue until the final deter-
Limitation mination, in favor of the party libeled, of the
proceedings in which the publication is made, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run against that cause of action
until then : .0fasterson v. Brozn, 72 Fed. Rep. 136.
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An ordinance of a municipal corporation, which provided
that " no person shall on any street or public place, or on land
Municipal adjacent thereto, sing or recite any profane or
Corporations, obscene song or ballad, or use any profane or
Ordinances,
Reasonable- obscene language," was recently held by the
ness Queen's Bench Division to be invalid, since, even
if the words " or on land adjacent thereto," which were clearly
too wide, were stricken out, it would still be unreasonable
because it did not contain any- words importing that the act
must be done so as to cause annoyance: Sirickland v. Hayes,
[1896] 1 Q. B. 290.
There is good reason to suppose that if the case rested
wholly on the latter ground, it would be reversed by the Court
of Appeal, if carried there ; for, despite the rejection of that
claim by the judges who heard the appeal from the justices,
there would seem to be no question but that the use of profane
or obscene language necessarily implies annoyance.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Dakota, when a valid motion is made and seconded at
a meeting of a board at which all the members are
Parliamentary
Law, present, but the chairman refuses to put it, on the
Refusal of ground that it is illegal, it may be put by the oneChairman to 2
put ,Motion, who made the motion; and if it receives the vote
power of of a majority of those present, it will be properly
Mleeting
carried, whether the others vote or not. Accord-
ingly, motions to remove an officer, to appoint another, and to
approve the bond of the latter, made, put and carried in this
way, will be effectual, if the power of doing the acts moved
resides in the board: State v. Archibald, 66 N. V7. Rep. 234.
In Thwaites v. Coulthwaite, [1896] I Ch. 496, Justice
Chitty, of the Chancery Division of England, has lately held,
that since the fact that one partner has been guiltyPartnership,
Action for of illegal acts in the conduct of the partnership
Account, business is no defence to an action for account by
Illegal
Business, the other partner, when the objects of the partner-
Bookmaking ship were not illegal, and the innocent partner
intended at the time of entering into the partnership that it
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should be carried on lawfully; and since a bookmaking and
betting business can be carried on without contravening the
Betting Act of 1853 (i6 & i7 Vict. c. 119,) and the plaintiff,
who was a partner in such a business, contemplated at the
time he entered into the partnership that it would be carried
on in the usual way ; the fact that the defendant acted illegally
was immaterial, and the plaintiff was entitled to an account.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently ruled, that since
the office of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a
Pleading, declaration upon the facts as alleged therein, its
Demurrer scope cannot be so extended by an agreed state-
ment of facts which neither amends nor purports to amend the
declaration, as to cover questions that might arise upon a
motion for nonsuit upon a state of facts appearing otherwise
than by the declaration Constitution Pub/is/hg Co. v. Steg-all,
24 S. E. Rep. 33.
It is not a violation of a constitutional provision (Const.
Tenn. Art. i, § 6,) that the right of trial by jury shall remain
Practice, inviolate, to compel the plaintiff, in a suit for
Trial, damages for the death of his intestate, to join in
Demurrer to
Evidence, a demurrer to the evidence, when the evidence is
Constitutional conceded to be true, and all legitimate and rea-
Law
sonable inferences that may be drawn from it are
admitted ; and further, such action is not in violation of a
provision (Const. Tenn. Art. 6, , 9.) that judges shall not
charge juries with respect to matters of fact: Hopkins v.
Xas/iville, C. & St. L. Ry., 34 S. W. Rep. 1029.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of
England, a municipal corporation owes to the public a duty to
Principaland so construct its sewers as not to injure the gas-
Agent, mains or other underground conveniences ; that it
Independent
Contractor, will be responsible. to any one injured in conse-
Liability for
Breach of quence of a breach of this duty, though the per-
Duty formance of it has been delegated to an independent
contractor ; and consequently that if a gas-main is broken by
the negligence of the contractor in executing the work, and
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an explosion takes place in a private house, because of the
escape of the gas fron the broken main, the municipality will
be liable, the damages not being too remote: Hardakei- v.
-11c District Council, [1896 ] 1 Q. B. 335.
The nature and incidents of the liability of the several
sureties upon an aggregate bond, i. e., one in which the
Principal principal is bound in a sum, for portions of
and Surety which only the several sureties are separately
Several
Bond, bound, has lately been investigated by the Supreme
Actions, Court of New York, at Special Term for New
Parties,
Contribution York County, in Tozc'O" v. Schd, 37 N. Y. Suppl.
879. It decided
(i) That a separate action may be maintained against each
of the sureties on such a bond on his separate liability, without
joining the other sureties as defendants;
(2) That the recovery against a surety on such a bond is
not limited to a proportionate amount of the total default, but
to the penal sum for which he binds himself; and
(3) That a surety who is compelled to pay more than his
just proportion of the default is entitled to contribution from
the others.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Spa/ding v.
Vi/as, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63 1, has passed upon the question of the
Public Officer, liability of a public officer for acts maliciously done
Liability for in the discharge of the duties of his office. The
Official Acts plaintiff alleged that Mr. Vilas, then Postmaster-
General, had acted maliciously in sending warrants for claims
put in his hands for collection to the claimants themselves,
instead of paying them to him in order that he might deduct his
fees therefrom: in consequence of which many of these fees
were not received by him, The court held that he could not
recover, since the rule which exonerites a judicial officer from
liability for official acts extends by analogy to the acts of all
public officers. This is tersely put by Mr. Justice Harlan:
"We are of opinion that the same general considerations of public
policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior
jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from acts done
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by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions
apply to a large extent to official communications made by heads of
executive departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed
upon them by law. The interests of the people require that due protec-
tion be accorded to them in respect of their official acts. As in the case
of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinction between action taken by
the head of a department in reference to matters which are manifestly
or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connec-
tion with the general matters committed by law to his control or super-
vision. Whatever difficulty may arise in applying these principles to
particular cases, in which the rights of the citizen may have been materi-
ally impaired by the inconsiderate or wrongful action of the head of a
department, it is clear-and the present case requires nothing more to be
determined-that he cannot be held liable to a civil suit for damages on
account of official communications made by him pursuant to an Act of
Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority, by reason of
any personal motive that might be alleged to have prompted his action ;
for personal motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized official con-
duct. In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an execu-
tive department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not
be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official con-
duct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective adminis-
tration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the gov-
ernment, if he were subjected to any such restraint. He may have legal
authority to act, but he may have such large discretion in the premises
that it will not always be his absolute duty to exercise the authority with
which he is invested. But if he acts, having authority, his conduct can-
not be made the foundation of a suit against him personally for damages,
even if the circumstances show that lie is not disagreeably impressed by
the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular indi-
viduals. In the present case, as we have found, the defendant, in issuing
the circular in question, did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line
of his duty, as Postmaster-General. The motive that impelled him to
do that of which the plaintiff complains is, therefore, wholly immaterial.
If we were to hold that the demurrer admitted, for the purposes of the
trial, that the defendant acted maliciously, that could not change the
law. "
According to a recent decision of the High Court of Jus-
tice of the Province of Ontario, a person who posts a letter
Railroads, on a mail car attached to a train abo'ut to start,
Mail Car, although the car is furnished under instructions
Invitation to
Post Letters, from the post-office department, with a slit for
Licensee posting letters, is a mere licensee, the invitation to
post, if any, being the invitation of the post-office department,
and not of the railroad company: and therefore one who, in
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attempting to post a letter on a moving train, trips over a
peg placed in the ground by the company, and is injured,
cannot recover: Spcncer v. Grand Trunk Ry. CO., 32 Can. L.
J. 235.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i, has held,
in a recent case, (I) That when there is a dispute over the
Religious rights of contending factions of an unincorporated
Societies, church to the use of the church property, an
Property
Rights, injunction will lie at the suit of the faction entitled
Injunction to the property to restrain trespasses thereon by
the other faction ; (2) That the deacons or trustees of an
unincorporated church, governed wholly through its congre-
gation, who are authorized as the constituted authority of the
church to control the use of its property, conveyed to trustees
in trust for the church, have authority to exclude those mem-
bers who refuse to recognize the authority of the regular
organization ; and (3) That if members of the congregation
are improperly excluded by the deacons from the use of the
church property, they must apply to the courts for redress, or
appeal to the congregation. They cannot resort to acts of'
trespass to gain entrance to the church: Fuibrzgi tv. Higgin-
hot/tan, 34 S. W. Rep. 875.
In Cincinnati St. Ry. Ca. v. Sneli, 43 N. E. Rep. 207, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has very clearly defined the respective
Street rights and duties of vehicles and foot-passengers
Railroads, at a street crossing. In that case the plaintiff, after
Crossings,
Stop, Look properly alighting from an cast-bound car on the
and Listen, off side, which made it necessary for him to cross
Alighting
Passengers both tracks in order to reach his destination,
started to cross them just behind the car from which he had
alighted, and, as he stepped on the other track, was struck
and injured by a west-bound car, which was running at an,
improper rate of speed, and came up without warning. The
various principles applicable to these facts were fully discussed
by the court, and laid down as follows :
(I) The introduction of new forms of vehicles and of new
motive power on street railways has not impaired the right of
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foot passengers to safe passage at street crossings. It is the
duty of drivers of vehicles of all sorts, whether wagons, bicy-
cles, or cars, to so regulate their speed, and give such warn-
ing of their approach, at whatever cost of pains and trouble
on their part, as that foot passengers, using ordinary care.
may, in the absence of unavoidable accident, cross in safety
(2) That a person about to cross the track of a street rail-
-way at a street crossing is bound to exercise a degree of care
proportioned to the danger to be avoided, and the conse-
quences which may result firom the want of it, according to
the particular circumstances ; but ordinar care does not
require that he should anticipate negligence on the part of
those who operate the railway, nor that he should always look
in both directions for the approach of a car; for whether or not
a failure to look is negligence depends entirely on the attend-
ant circumstances ; and
(3) That when a street-railway company operating a double
line of track discharges a passenger at a street crossing, hav-
ing reason to know that that passenger must cross its tracks
in order to reach his destination, it is the duty of the company
to pay due regard to the rights of the passenger while on the
crossing, and to so regulate the speed of its cars, and give
such warning of their approach, as will reasonably protect the
passenger from injury. An omission to do this is negligence,
and a person injured by reason thereof has a cause of
action against the company, unless barred by contributory
negligence.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently held, that a
Sunday aws, social club comes within the prohibition of its
SocialClub Sunday law, requiring that stores, shops, gro-
ceries and saloons be closed on Sunday: State v. Gdi, 19
So. Rep. 468.
A regulation of a telegraph company that its messenger
boy, sent to receive a telegram for transmission, shall be
deemed the agent of the sender, is invalid; andTelegraph
Companies, even if valid, it is waived by the company wvlhen,
Regulations on receiving a telegram requesting an answer, it
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'directs the messenger boy who delivers the telegram to wait
for a reply: Wills v. Postal Telcgraplh Cable Co., (Supreme
-Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department,)
37 N. Y. SuppI. 933.
In an action for damages for maliciously inducing persons
Tort, to break their business contracts with the plaintiff,
Inducing the latter is not required to prove specific damage;
Breach of
Contract, it is enough if he proves facts from which it may
Damages be properly inferred that some damage must result
toi the plaintiff from the defendant's wrongful acts : i-change
Tcl:gra-ph Co., Ltd. v. Gr,'go;r, & Co., [t896] I Q. B. 147,
The Court of Appeal of England has lately passed upon an
interesting question of law in regard to the effect of the resig-
nation of a member of a voluntary association,Voluntary,- d poe~o
Association, A voluntary trade protection society had been
Membership, formed, whose members became such by election,
Resignation and paid an annual subscription, in return for
which they were entitled to legal assistance for the purposes
of their trade, and to some other benefits. By the rules the
members incurred no obligations beyond the payment of their
subscriptions. These rules contained no provision as to the
retirement or expulsion of members. The plaintiff, one of the
members, after being such for over a year, wrote a letter
to the governing body of the society, stating that he desired
to withdraw his name as a member. No reply was sent him,
and a month later, having changed his mind and desiring to
continue as a member, he wrote to the chairman of the society,
requesting him to withdraw his resignation. In reply to this
the secretary of the society wrote him that the committee had
unanimously resolved to accept his resignation. After further
correspondence, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the com-
mittee from excluding him from membership.
The court held, reversing the decision of Justice Kekewich,
that in such a society a member could retire at any time
without the consent of the others; that the plaintiff ceased to
be a member so soon as the society received the letter stating
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his wish to retire, without the necessity of an acceptance of his
resignation by the society ; that he could not withdraw his
resignation before acceptance; and that he could not become
a member of the society again without a re-eiection ; Finch v.
Oakc, [18 9 6] 1 Ch. 409.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has recently rendered
a very sensible decision to the effect that if the name of a
witness is signed to the execution of a will byWill, Z
Attestation, another, at the witness's request, and in her
%%ging of presence and that of the testator, the attestation
Name by is sufficient, though the person whose name is
Another signed as a witness does not touch the pen;
provided that the witness, though able to write, is temporarily
so far incapacitated that she writes with difficulty, and is in
the habit of using an amanuensis: In re C'razford's Will, 24
S. E. Rep. 69.
A devise to the testator's wife of all his property, to be
disposed of by her among his children as she may think best,
Construction, vests a life estate in her, with power to divide the
Exercise land between his children as she thinks best; but,
of Power as a power of appointment must be exercised for
the benefit of the parties entitled thereto, and not with a view
of benefiting the donee of the power, the widow cannot in such
a case convey to one of the children a portion greater than
those granted to the other children, on condition that that
child should assume the payment of her debts, and provide
for her and her second husband during their lives: Dcgman v.
Degman, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 34 S. WV. Rep. 523.
According to a recent decision of Justice North, of the
Chancery Division, a clause in a will that directs the trustees
Construction, to pay "to each man who shall have been in my
Legacy employ over ten years," a certain sum for each
year's service beyond the ten years, applies to one who had
been in the employ of the testator for fifteen years, but had left
it before the date of the will, and was not in his employ at the
time of his death : In re Sharland, [ 189 6] I Ch. 5 17.
Ardemus S'tewart.
